Optimal pricing of court services by Rickman, N & Tzavara, D
Optimal pricing of court services∗
Neil Rickman†
University of Surrey and CEPR
Dionisia Tzavara
University of Surrey
September 29, 2004
Abstract
Litigants are generally charged for using court services. The charges
involved are usually set to achieve a combination of efficiency, equity
and funding goals. This paper presents a simple model, based on reg-
ulated monopoly pricing, to address the question of how these charges
should be set. We find that fixed fees generally form part of the opti-
mal charging package, despite concerns about their regressive nature.
Per-unit fees will also be used though they may be set below cost;
in this case, a trade-off emerges and the fixed fee is used to achieve
funding goals. Our model is a useful one for developing extensions
from the nonlinear pricing literature.
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1 Introduction
Although a court’s principal function is to adjudicate the outcomes of cases,
the procedure for doing this can involve a variety of inputs. Both parties
can apply to the court to acquire/enforce injunctions, force discovery of doc-
uments, seek an interim judgement, etc. Apart from aiding settlement, a
complementary benefit of providing services in this way is the hope that more
accurate decisions will be reached, perhaps as a result of more information
being placed before the court or through the same judge gaining familiarity
with the case as it proceeds. In England and Wales, to take a particular
example, the structure given to cases by Lord Woolf’s 1999 reforms have
more clearly ‘compartmentalised’ cases (once proceedings are issued) in this
way, and the aforementioned benefits received attention during the preceding
debate (Woolf (1996)).
In most jurisdictions, litigants are charged for the range of services offered
by the courts according to a pre-specified set of tariffs, determined by the
court.1 Policy makers typically claim a variety of objectives for these charges;
in particular, raising revenue (to cover the cost of the services provided), en-
1 Continuing with the example of England and Wales, see
www.courtservice.gov.uk/fandl/ch crt fees2.htm. The costs in question can
include fixed fees of £80 for allocating the case to a particular level of court; £50 upon
commencement of proceedings with value £300–£400; £500 upon commencement of
proceedings above £50,000; and per unit fees of £30 to summons a witness; £150 for a
detailed assessment of the opponent’s costs; etc.
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couraging efficient use of the courts (by deterring ‘weak’ cases) and enhancing
access to justice (by protecting low-income litigants from these costs). An
interesting example is the UK Government’s policy in this area which aims
at all of these: i.e. “recover[ing] the full cost of providing the civil courts”,
ensuring that “court services are provided efficiently and effectively”, and
aiming to be “fair” (LCD (1998), p. 1). Recently, the legal profession in
England and Wales has debated such issues in advance of some proposed
increases in the charges.2
With policy makers seeking to achieve such a variety of important ob-
jectives, court prices should be chosen within a framework that makes clear
the trade-offs that may be encountered in attempting to achieve them. The
role of courts and fees has received assorted attention in the literature. Au-
thors have examined the decision-making machinery of the court (Kirstein
and Schmidtchen (1997)), its propensity for error (Daughety and Reinganum
(1995)), the incentives that court costs may create (Rubinfeld and Sapping-
ton (1987)) and the role of court fees in criminal cases (Garoupa and Gravelle
(2002)). However, the setting of court prices has received limited attention.
The current paper suggests one way to correct this situation by recognising
a link between the court’s problem when setting fees and the literature on
optimal price regulation (Laffont and Tirole (1993); Wilson (1993)). Essen-
2See LCD (1999), Law Society (2002).
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tially, we think of the court as a monopolist, selling services to litigants at
prices regulated to maximise a particular notion of social welfare.3 In this
way, we seek to evaluate the policy options set out above. We show that
lump-sum filing fees can form part of the court’s optimal (two-part) tariff,
despite concerns in some quarters that they are regressive. We find a natural
maximum to this fee in circumstances where court fixed costs are covered.
We also indicate how the per unit price of services may then be set and
indicate how this can be done in conjunction with the fixed fee.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we present the basic
model before Section 3 derives and presents our main results. Section 4 dis-
cusses the paper and indicates how recent developments in non-linear pricing
might provide further insights for the ways in which court services should be
priced.
2 Model
A plaintiff (P) and defendant (D) are engaged in a civil action. The parties’
cases have strengths θP and θD respectively and although they are aware of
3Of course, in practice, courts may face a degree of ‘competition’ from several sources.
These may include courts in other jurisdictions (in some international cases for instance),
tribunals and alternative dispute resolution fora (such as arbitration and mediation ser-
vices). Thus, our analogy between the court and a monopolist represents something of
an approximation. Nonetheless, domestic courts are typically the pre-eminent forum for
adjudicating legal disputes so this approximation is a useful starting point for the topic
at hand.
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the this the court is not. We assume that {θP , θD} ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] and that,
in general, the court’s priors are independently distributed in the same way,
with cumulative distributions G(θP ) = G(θD) and densities g(θP ) = g(θD).
4
As well as ‘access’, the court sells homogeneous services and does not
price discriminate between P and D. In common with the examples given
in Footnote 1, it sets a filing fee F that only P pays, and a per unit price
of f for its services. The plaintiff buys qP of these and the defendant buys
qD. These demands are the result of P and D maximising payoff functions
UP (θP ) = uP (θP ) − F − fqP and UD(θD) = uD(θD) − fqD, with respect to
qP and qD respectively, where ui, i = P,D, are the gross benefits to each
party from the action: notice that, for simplicity, we assume US cost rules
(we return to this in Section 4). In Appendix A we provide a particular
example of how the demands qi(θP , θD, f), i = P,D, can be determined as
the Nash equilibrium of a litigation game (based on Hause (1989)). It seems
reasonable, as in our example, that these demands will increase with own
case strength and decrease with f . The effects of the opponent’s strength
may be harder to predict, as is the case with our example. Reduced form
gross surplus functions will, in general, be ui(qi, qj, θi, θj, f) for i 6= j = P,D.
4The assumption of independence may not always be realistic because a strong plain-
tiff will often be faced by a weak defendant (or vice versa), so G(θP , θD) may be more
appropriate. For reasons of tractability, much of our ensuing analysis assumes that θD is
observable so that G(θD) can be ignored.
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Notice that we must have uP > 0 for P to wish to pursue the action and we
assume that uD < 0 to ensure that D desires its avoidance.
Bearing the above in mind, and assuming that the court has no capacity
constraint, a constant per unit cost of c and fixed cost of K, we choose to
write its problem when setting prices as
max
F,f
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
θ∗P (F,f)
[uP (·) + uD(·)− F − f(qP + qD)]dG(θP )dG(θD) (1)
subject to
F [1−G(θ∗P (F, f)] + (f − c)
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
θ∗P (F,f)
(qP + qD)dG(θP )dG(θD) ≥ K (2)
where (2) is the court’s break-even constraint: i.e. following the policy dis-
cussion in the Introduction, full cost recovery is one of the objectives when
setting prices. Further, we allow for the possibility that the court wishes to
exclude plaintiffs with sufficiently weak cases, θP < θ
∗
P (·).5
Before proceeding to consider the solution, it is worth pausing to reflect
on several features of the problem set out in (1) and (2). The objective func-
5The model could accommodate a ‘multiproduct’ court, where injunctions, directions,
interim judgements, etc., may each have different prices; see generally Armstrong (1996).
Assume that there are k = 1, . . . ,K services. Then P’s probability of winning at trial could
be given by
∑
k q
k
P /
∑
k(q
k
P + q
k
D). Expenditure on services would be F +
∑
k fk(q
k
P + q
k
D).
Complexity would arise from the cross-elasticities that this would create. Further, we
could add other objectives, like minimising the probability of Type I and Type II errors;
see Rubinfeld and Sappington (1987).
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tion (1) assumes that welfare is the sum of the litigants’ payoffs. This is a
common assumption in models of litigation (see, for example, Gravelle (1989,
1990, 1993)). However, those models also include additional terms that our
problem ignores: in particular, the deterrence effect of litigation on ex ante
care levels (and hence the volume of litigation) and the valuable precedential
externality that flows from court decisions (see Cooter et al. (1982)). Effec-
tively, our welfare function is a static one that ignores the wider benefits of
civil courts as social institutions whose activity is central to the protection of
property rights and contracts. Whilst it would be possible to build a welfare
function with these features (see the aforementioned references), we feel that
our approach is useful for showing how the problem of determining prices
may be embedded within a welfare maximising framework.
Next consider the constraint (2). Though reflecting a ‘real world’ policy
position (in England and Wales for example), this ignores the fact that many
court services are subsidised, not least in order to encourage the positive
externalities produced by legal precedent. One way for the model to handle
this would be to require fees only to cover a fraction (α) of K, thereby
incorporating αK on the righthand-side of (2). As before, we feel that our
model is a useful starting point for modelling court pricing so we ignore this
issue in what follows. Clearly, such complications warrant further study.
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3 Results
3.1 Filing fee (F )
Consider the first-order condition for F . Letting λ ≥ 0 be the Lagrange
multiplier on (2)6, we have
∂L
∂F
= −
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
θ∗P
dG(θP )dG(θD)−
∫ 1
0
[u∗D − fq∗D]g(θ∗P )
∂θ∗P
∂F
dG(θD)
+ (1 + λ)
{
−Fg(θ∗P )
∂θ∗P
∂F
+ [1−G(θ∗P )]
}
− (1 + λ)(f − c)
∫ 1
0
(q∗P + q
∗
D)
∂θ∗P
∂F
g(θ∗P )dG(θD) (3)
where u∗D = uD(θ
∗
P , ·) < 0 and q∗i = qi(θ∗P , ·), i = P,D. Although it is possible
to derive results with (3), the intuition is clearer if we make the simplifying
assumption that D’s case strength is observable (so that there is no need to
integrate over θD). Employing this assumption and setting (3) equal to zero
at the (interior) optimum, (3) becomes
F +
u∗D−fq∗D
1+λ
+ (f − c)(q∗P + q∗D)
F
=
λ
1 + λ
1
EF
(4)
6We return to the sign of λ later.
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where (following Laffont and Tirole (1993), pp. 148–149) EF is the (negative
of) the elasticity of participation with respect to F.7 Equation (4) is a Ramsey-
type formula once one appreciates that a change in F will alter participation
and, in turn, will alter both P and D’s demands.8 As a result, this generates
a revenue of f−c per unit demand, which is part of the marginal ‘cost’ of the
change in participation. Further, of course, a change in P’s participation level
will impose a negative external effect on D since he will now have to defend
the case. This effect of changing F is captured by the middle expression in
the numerator in (4).
Clearly, the choice of F will depend on the sign of EF .
9 First consider
EF > 0, i.e. a higher value of F reduces plaintiff participation. In this case,
in common with other Ramsey rules, (4) exhibits a negative relationship
between the elasticity of participation and the value of F : when EF > 0, the
filing fee is lowered as drop-out becomes more sensitive to it. An additional
implication of (4) is that a fixed fee will generally be optimal as the equation
will generally be solved by F > 0. This is interesting because fixed filing fees
7This is expressed as
EF = −∂[1−G(θ
∗
P )]
∂F
F
1−G(θ∗P )
= g(θ∗P )
∂θ∗P
∂F
[
F
1−G(θ∗P )
]
8Note that the lefthand-side of (4) is an implicit function of F to the extent that (as
we shall see) this affects θ∗P . (F will not affect the marginal conditions that determine
the qi’s.) In principle, this may slightly complicate the effects below—they may often be
ignored because the indirect effects through θ∗P will often be sufficiently small.
9Appendix B shows how the sign of EF is determined.
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have often been regarded as a regressive means of raising funds (see Civil
Justice Council (2000)). Further, given u∗D − fq∗D < 0, it is clear that a
higher filing fee (F ) is required to achieve a given value of the righthand-side
in (4) so that when f < c a trade-off emerges between the two.
Now suppose that EF < 0, so that participation rises with F . This can
happen because changing P’s participation may lower D’s use of court services
(∂qD/∂θP T 0) and, thus, raise P’s gross surplus. The value of F may now
be positive or negative (subsidies to plaintiffs) depending on whether f T c
and the size of u∗D − fq∗D < 0.
3.2 Per-unit fee (f)
We now turn to the setting of f . The general first-order condition (with θD
unobservable) is given by
∂L
∂f
=
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
θ∗P
(
∂uP
∂qD
∂qD
∂f
+
∂uD
∂qP
∂qP
∂f
− qP − qD
)
dG(θP )dG(θD)
−
∫ 1
0
[u∗D − fq∗D]g(θ∗P )
∂θ∗P
∂f
dG(θD)
+ (1 + λ)
{
−Fg(θ∗P )
∂θ∗P
∂f
+
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
θ∗P
(qP + qD)dG(θP )dG(θD)
+ (f − c)
[∫ 1
0
∫ 1
θ∗P
(
∂qP
∂f
+
∂qD
∂f
)
dG(θP )dG(θD)
−
∫ 1
0
(q∗P + q
∗
D)g(θ
∗
P )
∂θ∗P
∂f
dG(θD)
]}
(5)
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It is useful to define the following expressions:
Aij ≡
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
θ∗P
∂ui
∂qj
∂qj
∂f
dG(θP )dG(θD) > 0, i 6= j = P,D (6)
Qi ≡
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
θ∗P
qidG(θP )dG(θD) > 0, i = P,D (7)
Q′i ≡
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
θ∗P
∂qi
∂f
dG(θP )dG(θD) < 0, i = P,D (8)
Expressions (7) and (8) are, respectively, the expected demand for court
services from litigant i and the derivative of this with respect to f . Expression
(6) can be thought of as the ‘adversarial’ demand for services, brought about
by the effect of litigant i on litigant j.
Once again, further progress is aided by assuming that the strength of
D’s case is observable to the court. Using this, plus (4) and (6)–(8), we can
rewrite (5). Assuming an interior solution for f , we now have:
APD + ADP + λ(QP +QD) + (f − c)(1 + λ)(Q′P +Q′D) = g(θ∗P )
∂θ∗P
∂f
λF
EF
⇒ f − c
f
=
λ
1 + λ
[
g(θ∗P )
∂θ∗P
∂f
F
EF
− (QP +QD)
]
Q′P +Q
′
D
− APD + ADP
(1 + λ)(Q′P +Q
′
D)
(9)
Now define the (positive) price elasticity of total demand (ef ) and the (neg-
10
ative of the) elasticity of participation with respect to per unit fees (Ef ).
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Then (9) becomes
f − c
f
=
λ
1 + λ
[(
1−G(θ∗P )
Q′P +Q
′
D
)
EfF
EF
+
1
ef
(
1− APD + ADP
λ(QP +QD)
)]
(10)
To interpret (10), notice that the lefthand-side is a Lerner index for the
mark-up of f over marginal cost. This varies inversely (as is usual) with
the price elasticity of demand, provided that the adversarial demands are
sufficiently small relative to the own demands (i.e. (APD+ADP )/(QP+QD) <
λ): to the extent that the adversarial effects are second-order ones, this seems
feasible. The first term on the righthand-side captures the extent to which
using f or F is a better means of raising revenue. Assuming λ > 0 (so
revenue ‘matters’), the court will set f T c according to Ef/EF . Suppose
that both of these are positive, so that increases in both fees lead to lower
participation.
If participation is more sensitive to f than F (i.e. Ef > EF ) then the
court should set a relatively low per-unit fee (note that Q′P + Q
′
D < 0). In
10These are given by
ef ≡ − (Q
′
P +Q
′
D)f
QP +QD
Ef ≡ −∂[1−G(θ
∗
P )]
∂f
(
f
1−G(θ∗P )
)
= g(θ∗P )
∂θ∗P
∂f
(
f
1−G(θ∗P )
)
Notice that, like EF , Ef T 0: see Appendix B.
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other words, when the court has to raise revenue, it cannot afford to cut
too many would-be cases out of the court system and, therefore, chooses a
combination of f and F that encourages P to bring a case. In principle, it
is possible that this effect may lead to f < c, i.e. less than full cost recovery
on itemised court services. In this case, (4) tells us that the setting of F
will also be affected. In particular, F will have to rise (for EF > 0) to help
achieve the overall objective of full cost recovery.
Finally, we address the question of whether λ > 0 (so that (2) binds),
or λ = 0. Notice from (10) that f = c when λ = 0 and that, given this,
F = −(u∗D − fq∗D) > 0 from (4). Thus, necessary conditions for the revenue
constraint not to bind are that it is optimal to set per unit charges at marginal
cost and the ‘entry fee’ equal to the disutility imposed on D from being
brought into the litigation. Effectively, once individual services are paid for
(f = c), the other cost to cover is (some fraction) of the externality imposed
on D when bringing the case. The natural maximum one would choose for
this is the total cost experienced by D (i.e. u∗D − fq∗D) and it is this that P
is forced to internalise. These conditions are not, however, sufficient since
(2) tells us that λ = 0 also requires −(u∗D − fq∗D) ≥ K/[(1−G(θ∗P )], i.e. the
representative D’s costs are sufficiently higher than the court’s fixed cost of
running the case—an empirical matter.
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4 Discussion and extensions
We have shown that optimal pricing of court services will generally involve
lump-sum filing fees and per unit charges. This is so despite concerns about
the effects of such costs on access to justice. We have also shown, however,
that a trade-off can exist between the filing fee and the per-unit fees so that
subsidy may take place on, say, itemised court services without jeopardising
full cost recovery.
These are important insights for an area where, understandably, debate
may sometimes lose sight of the need for rational assessment of the policy
options. We believe the framework put forward above is a useful starting
point for considering issues of access to justice, efficiency and funding of
court services when setting court fees. Of course, a useful framework should
also point the way to analysis that can further illuminate matters. Thus, we
end the paper by suggesting several extensions that would provide a research
agenda for further work.
4.1 UK cost rules
In Britain (and parts of Europe) the winner’s legal costs are paid by the losing
party. In the US, both parties pay their own costs regardless of outcome.
Assuming (as in Appendix A) that the parties agree on the probabilities of
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win/loss at trial, these would not change the aggregate net surplus function
in (1) as this simply nets off the total costs of the case from the total gross
payoffs (see Reinganum and Wilde (1986)). Of course individual payoffs
would differ (as demonstrated in Appendix A), so the Nash service demands
would differ too. From Hause (1989), the UK demands would be higher
because the UK rule triggers an ‘arms race’ where costs escalate as the parties
attempt to oﬄoad them on the opponent. Thus, the model can accommodate
these changes. It would be an interesting exercise to compare the court
charges under each rule: it seems likely that numerical simulation would be
required here.
4.2 Low income groups
Our model would generate an ‘efficient’ cut-off θ∗P in the sense that weak
cases would be deterred. However, the access to justice debate surrounding
fees typically refers to people with strong cases being unable to bring their
cases because of the cost being too high.
One might explore this issue more fully if the individual maximisations
described in Appendix A were carried out subject to an income (m) con-
straint: e.g. F + fqP ≤ m, generating Marshallian demands qP (·,m). Then,
if m were distributed (independent of θP ) some low income cases would be
14
included above θ∗P with the result that they would not be brought, despite
being efficient.
4.3 Further models of nonlinear pricing
Recent literature on nonlinear pricing suggests that our model may place too
many constraints on the available prices. For example, we do not allow prices
to differ across litigants (i.e. no ‘quantity discounting’). This may be optimal
in some settings, though see Armstrong and Vickers (2001) and Rochet and
Chon (1998) for analyses examining this claim. Further, we could think of
the court as a multiproduct monopolist and examine the range of prices it
should charge for its services (see Armstrong (1996)). Alternatively, Rochet
and Stole (2002) allow for randomness in the buyer-seller matching process
and this seems to capture the important fact that litigants rarely plan ex ante
to meet each other in court. Each of these papers suggests that the optimal
price set for a regulated monopolist’s output (e.g. a court’s services) will
be a delicate balance of access, efficiency and funding issues as well as the
information available and the nature of the ‘matching process’ taking place
prior to litigation. Developing the model we have presented along these lines
may provide valuable insights into the principles that should govern these
prices.
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4.4 The welfare framework
We close by returning to the discussion of our welfare framework in Sec-
tion 2. We note that our utilitarian set-up can be amended to reflect more
closely welfare functions in the literature, not least by incorporating ex ante
care levels and the value of legal precedent. This latter point also highlights
the static nature of the way we have set up the problem. In addition, our
modelling of full-cost recovery, while reflecting elements of current policy
debate, does not capture the subsidies that may be needed to ensure that
sufficient precedential externalities are produced by use of the legal system.
In practice, fees that do not allow for such precedent may have several effects.
To begin, they could prevent legitimate attempts to protect contracts and
property rights in future. Second, they may encourage the use of increased
legislation in order to substitute for a reduced level of case law. Third, they
may prevent the challenging of inefficient legislation, thereby potentially im-
peding the efficient protection of property rights that legal systems typically
aim to achieve (see Coase (1960), Cooter et al. (1982)). In each situation,
the evolution of the legal institutions involved will be affected by the choice
of legal fees.11
11Indeed, the level of fees may influence the evolution of legal institutions in another
way. It is possible to imagine a domestic court system pricing itself out of the adjudication
market in the face of cheaper competition from various arbitration services and/or overseas
courts (especially in the case of commercial work).
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Whilst acknowledging these omissions from our model, and their possible
implications, we have argued that our approach is a helpful one for begin-
ning to analyse the determination of court pricing. Certainly, policy makers
express varying objectives for these fees and it is important to develop frame-
works for evaluating these and the trade-offs they may generate. Of course,
issues such as those listed above go to the heart of the wider social role played
by the courts and should form part of any research agenda flowing from this
paper.
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Appendix
A An example of demands
To confirm that an established model of litigation produces the demands for
services we have assumed, imagine that P’s net payoff from bringing the case
is
UP (θP ) =
qP
qP + qD
θPx− F − fqP
where x is the commonly observed level of damages at stake and we have
assumed US cost rules.12 Thus, a stronger P (higher θP ) expects to receive
more from the case. Also, the sense in which use of the court helps improve
the decision is captured: if qP = 0 then P cannot win regardless of the
strength of his case (θP ).
12Under UK rules, P’s equivalent payoff would be
UUKP =
qP
qP + qD
θPx−
(
1− qP
qP + qD
θP
)
(F + fqP + fqD).
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Now consider D. Once the case is brought, he must defend it. Failure to
do so would result in the court awarding a default judgement to P. Thus, if D
does nothing (qD = 0) he can expect to pay out θPx (since qP/(qP + qD) = 1
when qD = 0). Thus, his net payoff from using the legal system is
UD(θD) = θPx− qP
qP + qD
θDx− fqP
If the two parties play a Nash game in court services it is straightforward
to show that the pure strategy equilibrium is given by
qNP = Θ
2
P
θDx
f
, qND = Θ
2
D
θPx
f
where Θi ≡ θi/(θP + θD), i = P,D. More generally, the Nash demands on
court services are qi(θP , θD, f), i = P,D. Both parties’ demands rise with
the damages at stake and fall with the per unit price of court services. Also,
some rearrangement yields
∂qNi
∂θi
=
2x
f
Θ2iΘj > 0, i = P,D
and
∂qNi
∂θj
=
x
f
Θ2i (1− 2Θj) T 0, i, j = P,D, i 6= j
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Thus, demands rise in own strength but litigant i’s demand will only rise
in litigant j’s strength if i’s strength is sufficiently great: i.e. Θj <
1
2
.
The former of these is important: it is analogous the Laffont and Tirole
(1993)’s assumption that ‘higher θ’ consumers value the product more in
their standard model of optimal regulated prices; in our model, this is true
because the productivity of court services is higher.
B The elasticities
It is clear from Footnote 7 that signEF = sign ∂θ
∗
P/∂F . We must therefore
sign the latter derivative. Note that θ∗P is defined by
uP (qP (θ
∗
P , θD, f), qD(θ
∗
P , θD, f), θ
∗
P , θD, f)− F − fqP (θ∗P , θD, f) ≡ 0
Then the implicit function theorem (and the envelope theorem) tells us that
∂θ∗P
∂F
=
1
∂uP
∂θP
+ ∂uP
∂qD
∂qD
∂θP
T 0
Thus, EF T 0. This is also true of Ef because
∂θ∗P
∂f
=
∂θ∗P
∂F
(
qP − ∂uP
∂qD
∂qD
∂f
)
T 0.
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